Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). For example, where Kant teaches that one should never lie because truth-telling is an absolute duty, Aristotle might teach that honesty is an absolute duty that is compatible with the occasional white lie. In this paper, I shall argue that virtue ethics is superior to rival approaches in that it is more applicable and more human. We begin by discussing two objections from a Kantian point of view. We then note some of the conceptual attractions of virtue theory. We conclude with responses to the Kantian objections and a suggestion for further research.
The list of the seven capital vices includes sloth, envy, avarice, vainglory, gluttony, lust, and anger. One of the seven stands out, at least for a contemporary audience: the vice of sloth. In many people’s minds, sloth is simply laziness. But is laziness in fact a moral failing? Laziness seems to be a psychological problem or a value-neutral habit rather than a serious sin and moral failing. In this paper, I will argue that Thomas Aquinas’s conception of the vice of sloth provides the link between the ancient Christian and contemporary conceptions because sloth sees the burdens of love as sorrowful rather than joyful. In part I of the paper, I will briefly trace the history of sloth in order to uncover the various sources of sloth’s association with laziness. In part II, I will show how Aquinas’s definition of sloth is that of sorrow divorced from joy. In part III, I ask what specifically causes the sorrow of sloth, identifying the burden of loving others as the chief cause.
Sketch the outline of the paper: In part I of the paper, I will briefly trace the history of sloth in order to uncover the various sources of sloth’s association with laziness. In part II, I will show how Aquinas’s definition of sloth is that of sorrow divorced from joy. In part III, I ask what specifically causes the sorrow of sloth, identifying the burden of loving others as the chief cause.
Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). For example, where Kant teaches that one should never lie because truth-telling is an absolute duty, Aristotle might teach that honesty is an absolute duty that is compatible with the occasional white lie. In this paper, I shall argue that virtue ethics is superior to rival approaches in that it is more applicable and more human. We begin by discussing two objections from a Kantian point of view. We then note some of the conceptual attractions of virtue theory. We conclude with responses to the Kantian objections and a suggestion for further research.
Aquinas’s conception of acedia explains why it merits a place among the seven capital vices. On his account, acedia strikes at the heart of who we are called to be by turning us against our own happiness and ultimate end. It does so because it perceives the demands of friendship with God as a burdensome self-sacrifice, and it clings to the old self while resisting the demands of love. In the words of Isaac Watts, “Love so amazing, so divine, demands my self, my life, my all.”82 Acedia thus involves aversion to more than just bodily effort, although that may certainly be involved; properly speaking, it shirks the long, painful process of dying away to one’s whole sinful nature, which encompasses body and soul, action and will. In that sense, Aquinas’s characterization of acedia explains why it should count as one of the most serious of the vices, undermining, as it does, our fundamental motivation to engage in the process of forming our character after the pattern of Christ.
Without acedia’s link to charity, however, the historical turns that reduced this vice to simple laziness and made diligence its logical counterpoint are perfectly understandable. It is a virtue of Aquinas’s account that he incorporates the link to laziness in his characterization of acedia, since the element of bodily weariness and physical effort is present in conceptions of the vice from its beginnings with Evagrius and on into the present day. Only because his conception of this vice makes resistance to the demands of charity central, however, can he also pay due to the strands of the Christian tradition that make acedia a spiritual and a capital vice. Hence his account stands as a helpful explanation of why acedia was taken to be such a serious vice for many centuries, and why contemporary accounts tend to fail to see its importance.